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1. Theoretical introduction 
1.1. Political and social background  
 
After the democratic turn there was an emergence of neonationalism and 
neotraditionalism in Central and Eastern Europe, too. As a new set of 
phenomena, this was strongly related to the characteristics and the outcome of 
the transition. It entailed an emphasis on historical continuity and an urge to 
strengthen national identity, which gained importance especially in the newly 
established nation-states, due to the weak legitimacy of the new elites. Many 
politicians expected to gather ideological support for their political goals from 
extreme nationalism, which, as a result of the reinterpretation of national 
identities as well as political battles, motivated the reappearance of authoritarian 
tendencies. Although these trends seemed to become marginalized after the 
democratic consolidation, radicalism and extremism have remained strong in the 
political arena. Similarly to the history of West European right-wing radical 
mobilization, it was again proven that “crisis movements” are inextricably 
linked with the turmoil generated by social transition and the problems of 
modernization deriving from the need to “catch up with the West”. 
According to Sir Winston Churchill’s ironic bon mot, “democracy is 
the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been 
tried from time to time.” We can thus assume as well that constitutional 
democracy, even with all its shortcomings, is the only possible means at present 
to achieve high-level legitimacy. Besides, democratic processes and institutions 
themselves will not result in less equality and more social vulnerability. 
Moreover, by the beginning of the 21st century democracy has become such a 
strong marker of the spirit of our time that even those political parties that are 
openly right-wing claim to be “national democrats” or “central democrats”. 
Since theoretically each and every interest or ideology is free to find its 
organizational form in democratic regimes, the radical organizations are indeed 
bound to use “real democracy” as a catchword. In those democracies where the 
law allows organizations to influence the work of the government and the 
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parliament, as well as decision-making, the protection of rights is theoretically 
effective in the case of radical groups, too (as it has been pointed out on several 
occasions by, for example, the “hard core” of the Fall 2006 rioters and the 
founders of the Hungarian guards themselves). As Philippe Breton writes, 
“Democracy has the unique capacity ... to give space to other discourses, which 
are not necessarily democratic” (Breton [2000] p. 54).  
As a result of this radical conditioning of “democratic” interests and 
needs, many researchers think that with the acceptance and strengthening of 
these radical claims, societies will soon get used to the idea that there is nothing 
wrong with violating the constitutional rights of minorities or breaking 
constitutional principles (see: Bayer [2002]; Decker [2003]; Betz [2004]; 
Cuperus [2006]). Lately, we could hear such claims not only from former 
members of the “new right” but also the politicians of Jobbik – The Movement 
for a Better Hungary (JMMP), who have frequently presented their exclusionary 
ideology through “coded” messages. What is the most alarming about this is that 
if these populist ideas about “the people’s rule” are taken up by the political 
elite, radical rhetoric will be elevated to the level of “acceptable ideologies” and 
incorporated into democratic discourse. This will easily lead to the destruction 
of the very constitutional basis of democracy. The “blackmailing” effected by 
“national radicals” will channel political discourse in the public sphere in a way 
that some of their programs will become part of mainstream politics, thereby 
legitimizing a false notion of people’s rule based on collectivism, as well as its 
related political expectations. 
This phenomenon is visible not only in Western Europe but in Central 
and Eastern Europe as well. In Hungary right-wing radicalism first emerged 
within the democratic parties that effected the regime change, and only later did 
it become an independent ideology. At the time of the democratic transition, 
radical factions in Hungary were formed within the legitimately operating 
moderate right-wing parties, which was not characteristic in Western European 
countries. Hungarian examples include István Csurka and his plebeian populist 
wing in the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), Izabella B. Király, who 
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supported skinheads (members of the Hungarian Youth Association), or József 
Torgyán, under whose leadership the skinhead “youth faction” within the 
Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKgP) enjoyed the party’s support. 
 
1.2. Description of the research problem, the subject of research, the 
population and the observational unit 
 
In my dissertation I map the network of relations between Hungarian right-wing 
(national) radicals and the national guards that have existed since 2007, and 
show the similarities and differences between “eastern” and “western” versions 
of right-wing radicalism. The results of this comparison may explain why the 
connection I just mentioned entails the formation of national guards (maybe 
with the exception of the Italian National Guard or the “Black Guard”), since 
in several countries of Central and Eastern Europe the rise of right-wing 
radicalism came with the formation of semi-legal irregular forces. 
Hungary is in the forefront concerning the formation of these groups. 
Hungarian national guards were among the first ones to be formed in the 
summer of 2007, and in the same year the Budapest Prosecution Service was 
one of the first public authorities to apply for the dissolution of the Hungarian 
Guard Association for Protection of Traditions and Culture at the Court of 
Budapest. The prosecution service decided to submit an application for 
dissolution because it claimed that the Hungarian Guard broke the 
organizational law with its activity: its demonstrations and the public statements 
of its leaders qualified as discrimination and verbal violence against minorities. 
The lawsuit started in March 2008, and the trial was first adjourned until May, 
then in December, after a long trial, the guard was dissolved. An appeal was 
submitted right away, so the court decision became final only on July 2, 2009. 
The reformulation of a legally dissolved guard movement also 
occurred first in Hungary, in the presence and with the assistance of the leaders 
of JMMP. They quoted an article of law that states that if a community 
(movement) does not qualify as a social organization, it can continue its 
activities. They argued that the organizational nature of the Hungarian Guard 
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does not conform to the legal definition of organizational structure, since it is 
not associated or connected with any association or other group that would 
legally qualify as an organization. Therefore, the Hungarian Guard was by no 
means the legal successor of the dissolved Hungarian Guard Association; 
consequently, it could not be accused of any illegal act which would obviously 
sanction the activity of the dissolved social organization. For the same reason, 
the active members of the organization could not be penalized for offences on 
grounds of a government decree that had just come into effect. Similar 
arguments came up in lawsuits that were started for the dissolution of other 
guard-like forces. 
In the meantime, it could be seen on the Internet that the units 
commonly referred to as “guards” started to take off or “update” their websites. 
Thus, in the last part of my dissertation I try to prove, with the help of network 
relations analysis, that despite the obvious conspiracy concerning the “guards”, 
the relations both between the paramilitary organizations and the radical right-
wing (national) political organizations, and between the radical organizations 
and extreme right-wing organizations have remained intact. 
The reasons for this are the following: 1. The extreme right came to 
accept as authentic figures some radical right-wing politicians and activists 
(such as Vona, Budaházy and Toroczkai). 2. They share an ideological basis that 
favors extreme nationalism, antisemitism, and racism or “xenophobia”. 3. 
Although in the 1990s, the strategic unity between the traditional “national 
socialists” and “national radicals” was broken, several new conspirative 
meetings were held to restore this unity. All these initiatives significantly 
contributed to the success of JMMP as a political party at the 2010 
parliamentary elections. 4. Besides, the sporadic western Hungarist immigrant 
groups also urged to reestablish this alliance, calling for the support of the 
members and advocates of neonazi and skinhead organizations for JMMP. 
 Finally, on June 4, 2010, another guard named Hungarian National 
Guard was formed on the ruins of the Hungarian Guard [and of its splinter 
group called Independent Hungarian Guard (Protective Wing)], which had been 
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pushed into the background, with their operation made impossible, during the 
time of the 2010 parliamentary elections. This organization chose the design of 
its Árpád-striped badge on the basis of Rákóczi’s flag, and its motto also  
referred to the Rákóczi War of Independence: Cum Deo Pro Patria Et Libertate 
(that is, With God for the country and for liberty).  
As can be seen, Hungary is a leader in terms of reformulating national 
guards as well. 
 
2. Research structure, methodology, and theses 
2.1. Plurality of research methods 
 
In my dissertation I attempted to prove the existence and operation of the 
network of relations between right-wing (national) radicals and the extreme 
right-wing, and the national guards on the basis of my quantitative empirical 
research and with the use of analytical methods less frequently applied in 
political science. My primary source of data was the Internet, the World Wide 
Web, and I tested my hypotheses with the empirical analysis of information 
obtained on the Internet. 
In political science it is not unusual to apply a variety of research 
methods; sociological methods are often employed to study political 
phenomena. Political sociology is a hybrid, that is, it lies on the interdisciplinary 
territory of political science and sociology (see: Sartori [1969]; Dogan [2003] p. 
117). Thus, political sociology combines explanations for the dimensions of 
social and political structures. 
 
2.2. Structure of the dissertation  
 
In Chapter 1, I first outline the theoretical introduction, then I formulate the 
most important hypotheses of the dissertation. After that I outline the 
development and changes – that is, the theoretical traditions – of my analytical 
method, which is network analysis. I define the concept of Social Network 
Analysis (SNA) and discuss the advantages of this method.  
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 Next, I identify the research problem and define the subject, the 
population, and the observational unit of my research. In this part I also describe 
the process of sampling, and the method of data collection and analysis. I define 
the time limits of the research, and explain the area of sampling and data 
collection. 
 In the next part of the dissertation I define the terms applied in the 
work, and outline and discuss the relevant literature in the field. As part of 
Chapter 2, I deal with the most important terms related to the political-
historical background of my topic, especially with the nature of regular and 
volunteer military organizations, militias, guards and other national military 
groups, revolting units, guerilla troops and commandoes, while in Chapter 3 I 
explain the terms of neoconservativism and “the new right”, right-wing 
radicalism, right-wing (national) radical trends and extreme right. 
 In Chapter 4, I give an overview of guard-type organizations in the 
framework of a “west-east” dimension. The goal of this historical overview is to 
give a comparative analysis of the characteristics of these organizations. As far 
as “western” regular and irregular guards are concerned, I mention the British 
Household Divison and the Home Guard, the French Guard Nationale and the 
francs-tireurs (“free shooters”), the US National Guard, and various radical 
militias and guerilla troops from North and Latin America. 
As for the Italian guards, I present a selection of organizations from 
the “Redshirts” to the fascios and squadros. I give an overview of German 
guards from the irregular troops organized after World War I to the SA and the 
SS, the “black Elite Guard”. I also point out the fact that the formation of 
auxiliary troops and the “national” Waffen-SS legions of European volunteers 
during World War II led to a certain “de-elitization” of the SS. Finally, I 
mention two contemporary examples, those of Poland and Hungary, where 
some historical aspects explain the presence of paramilitary guards in the 
country. As for Hungarian guards, I give a historical overview of units formed 
officially, that is, within the state’s “monopoly of violence”, from the Hungarian 
Royal Noble Body Guard to the Republic Guard Regiment; and also discuss in 
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detail a selection of units formed outside the state monopoly of violence, 
namely, the armed force and the officers’ detachments formed after “Great 
War”, the “Scrubby Guard”, and the commandoes and “guards” of the Arrow-
Cross Movement. 
In Chapter 5, I discuss the chances for the formation of contemporary 
irregular or illegitimate guards in the “west” and the “east”. My aim here is also 
to point out similarities and differences between these geographical areas. As 
can be seen, in Western Europe there are “only” loose fronts of resistance (e.g. 
in Austria or contemporary Germany); in Spain and Northern Ireland, separatist 
terrorist groups often endanger public order with their attacks. In this respect 
Southern Europe is “the odd one out”, since it is the only place in the “western 
region” where an organization similar to the Hungarian guards was formed; 
namely, the Italian National Guard. 
 Thus, the “craze of organizing guards”, which motivated this 
dissertation, can be considered a primarily Central Eastern European 
phenomenon, since the illegal paramilitary units of the continent were formed in 
this region. The formation of the Romanian Noua Dreaptã, the civil war guards, 
militias and guerilla troops in Serbia and the other successor states of 
Yugoslavia, the Chech National Guard, the Slovenskú Pospolitost' – Národnú 
Stranu (SP-NS) in Slovakia, the Bulgarian National Guard, the Hungarian 
Guard, and its successor, the Hungarian National Guard, as well as the 
Hungarian National Defence Association, the National Liberation Front of 
Hungarian Defenders, and the Army of Outlaws shows this tendency. (With the 
exception of the Bulgarian and Chech National Guards, all non-Hungarian 
guards are anti-Hungarian, so the Hungarian Guard and its successor 
organizations can in effect be considered “lonely units” in the region.)  
 Finally, in Chapter 6, I analyze the network of relations between 
Hungarian irregular units formed outside the state monopoly of violence and the 
political parties, movements and organizations, as well as answer the questions 
raised in the hypotheses of the research. In the analysis of the network of 
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relations I examine the sample of the research, and identify and analyze the 
network relations of the sampled organizations and their web pages. 
 
2.3. A new aspect of the research: SNA as a research method in 
political science 
 
The analytical method mentioned in Chapter 1 – Social Network Analysis – can 
be considered a new approach in Hungarian political scientific research. But 
what do the terms social network and Social Network Analysis (SNA) mean? 
Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust [1994] give the following definiton of 
the first term: a social network is made up of a certain number of agents and the 
relations between them. The agents can be individuals, organizations, 
companies, nations, that is, collective social units, and the relations may be 
defined as a set of certain types of ties. How can we define and describe these 
ties? According to Zsófia Kürtösi, a tie creates a contact between agents, which 
can have different kinds of content. It can entail the transfer of 1) tangible assets 
(e.g. barter, trade, gift) or 2) non-tangible assets (e.g. information, advice) from 
one agent to the other. It may also refer to 3) biological relations (e.g. relatives, 
marriage), 4) physical connection (e.g. road, bridge), association, group 
affiliation (e.g. club members, group members), or 5) one person’s valuation of 
another (e.g. friendship), as well as 6) formal relations (e.g. authority, power) 
(see: Kürtösi [2002]). 
The starting points of social network analysis are the patterns that can 
be identified within the interaction between individuals and groups. Since the 
characteristics of an agent (e.g. age, gender, ethnicity) may be considered 
constant, regardless of context, while the relations are context-specific, they can 
vary according to the changes in interaction. Thus, the goal of relations analysis 
is not only to describe characteristics but also to interpret the social-structural 
context. This latter aspect is what social network analysis adds to the traditional 
lines of characteristic-based research. The reason for this is that the pattern of 
the existing and missing relations between the subjects of the network forms a 
peculiar network structure. This also points to the central problem of network 
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analysis: the aim to explain the differences in the relations between the subjects 
within the network. As David Knoke and James H. Kuklinski write, “The 
structure of relations between the subjects and their situation within the network 
have important effects on behaviour, perception and attitude both in terms of the 
individual units and the whole system” (Knoke-Kuklinski [1988] p. 13, Albert-
Dávid [1994]). 
Therefore, SNA makes it possible to give the quantitative analysis of 
relations between various participants (e.g. individuals, groups, organizations, 
nation states). Many disciplines, such as physics, biology, psychology, 
sociology and political science employ this method. However, in political 
science, it has been rarely used, even though it is very effective for the 
examination of relations between political actors. Among the users of this 
method are Knoke, who summarized the results of two decades of political 
network analysis in the research of voter preferences, social movements, formal 
organizations, and elites in his work (Knoke [1990]). Thus, when examining 
social movements, the standpoint offered by network analysis may also be 
applicable, since it regards collective action as dependent on social context and 
the ties of individual actors (see: Diani-McAdam [2002]). Moreover, the method 
can also be effectively used in the analysis of policy networks of nation states 
(Knoke [1990; 1995]), as well as in the examination of supranational formations 
(see: Thurner-Binder [2008]).  
 
2.4. Theses 
 
The most important theses of my dissertation, which I wanted to prove 
empirically, are the following:  
 
1. At the time of high-tech devices of communication (e.g. mobile phones, the 
Internet, email, etc.) the mechanisms of organizing political movements are now different 
from what they were before. Thus, this issue can be approached theoretically from the 
point of view of a postmodern political concept, but also from the angle of campaigning 
(marketing) methods provided by the structure of “4D” communication, that is, “new 
media”, and the networks of relations based on them. Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a 
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useful method for examining social movements, since it regards collective actions as 
dependent not only on the social context but also on the ties of individual actors. Thus, it 
can be applied in the analysis of both political networks and supranational political 
formations, as it enables the researcher to map the network of their relations, as well. With 
the method of SNA both the analysis of relations between political participants and the 
positions (centrality or marginality) of the respective actors within the network can be 
identified. These analyses normally give a better explanation to the phenomena related to 
acquiring such positions than any other available parameter, since it is not the 
characteristics of actors (basic parameters) but the structural situations (resources) that 
have a greater explanatory power in the case of such analyses. 
 
2. According to earlier reports issued by the National Security Office (NBH), the 
Hungarian radical (national) right-wing organizations work separately from each other: 
they are small, isolated groups with rivalling leaders and ideologies, so there is no danger 
for them to develop into a united radical political movement or organization.1 As opposed 
to this, by now the small radical circles, which have been active and expanding since the 
fall of 2006, have formed an effective alliance, by means of common operations organized 
and mobilized via the Internet and mobile connections, as well as the political marketing 
supported by the foundation of guards and easily identifiable labels and symbols. This 
unity first made a shocking effect on the public at the time of the 2009 EU elections, and 
then in 2010, when – partly as a result of the intensive and collective right-wing strategies 
for the delegitimization of the government – it largely contributed to the success of Jobbik 
– The Movement for a Better Hungary (JMMP) as a political party at the parliamentary 
elections. (This process actually became disadvantageous for the moderate right-wing 
parties, as well, such as Fidesz-KDNP.) 
 
3. With the analysis of the major elements of “policy making” – even with an 
examination that did not include all aspects – I could prove, by looking at the networks of 
relations between the web pages of the examined organizations, that the structural 
characteristics of these networks not only disqualify the statements made by NBH in their 
yearly reports but also partly suggest that radical right-wing expansion in Hungary does 
not necessarily adapt to the “western trends” but departs from them in certain respects. In 
the background of the unity between Hungarian radicals, network relations showed the 
                                                 
1 See: NBH Yearbooks 1999-2008. http://www.nbh.hu/bmenu7.htm. 
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presence of the “prestige principle”. This might mislead the superficial observer, since at 
first sight it may seem that radical (national) right-wing organizations do not keep close 
contact with organizations more extreme than themselves; however, my Internet-based 
research proved that the latter (more extreme) groups like to refer to their ideological and 
practical cooperation in action with the former groups, and when it comes to particular 
demonstrations, they like to be present on their side. The reverse may not be case, which 
corresponds to what is written in the international literature on political science. However, 
with the help of network analysis, an intensive network of relations can be identified. 
 
4. In Western and Central and Eastern Europe, regular and irregular guards have 
historical traditions. In European countries, the formation of guards related to radical 
parties or movements greatly depends on the particular country’s democratic traditions, 
fights for independence, its position as a successor state after World War I, and finally, its 
state socialist past as a whole. In those postcommunist countries of Central and Easter 
Europe where the intermediary institutions of the civil sphere are more firmly embedded 
in society, and where the historical roots of independent statehood or the development of a 
unified nation state are stronger, guards did not form at all, or if they did, they took the 
form of irregular “neoconservative” or “new right-wing” paramilitary organizations, 
whose ties to the historical extreme right are weak. These radical organizations are more 
likely to find the roots of their identity in national-conservative traditions alive between 
the two world wars (e.g. in Poland, Hungary, and the Chech Republic). In other countries, 
such as Serbia, tradition and new conflict situations together motivated the formation of 
such armed forces, while in Slovakia and Bulgaria, partly in the name of neonationalism 
and neotraditionalism, the ideologies of these guards are much more strongly connected to 
“fascist phenomena” during the interwar period. 
 
2.5. Sampling, methods of data collection and analysis: The 
examination of the network of relations between radical and extreme 
right-wing organizations 
 
The development of the method of Social Network Analysis (SNA) is related to 
the institutional restructuring of sociology after World War II. Its major points 
can be summed up as follows: 1. The primacy of relations (connections between 
the members of the population under scrutiny) over attributes is postulated. 2. 
There is a well-established set of special terms used in the analysis. 3. The 
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actors – the nodes of networks – may be individual persons, but even in that 
case they act as representatives of organizations, events and positions. Finally, 
actors come into contact with each other in a controlled (e.g. based on 
sympathy) or uncontrolled (based on a common ideology) way.  
In my dissertation, therefore, I do not present the characterestics of 
individual organizations, but the features of their network of relations, their 
network analysis, in order to prove the hypotheses raised in the theoretical part, 
that is, to indicate the positions of radical (national) right-wing and extreme 
right-wing parties, movements and organizations within their network of 
relations, as well as their centrality or marginality. It is not the characteristics of 
the individual actors (their basic parameters) but their structural situation 
(resources) that had the greater explanatory power, since, as John F. Padgett 
states, these resources are also the decisive factors in “policy making” (Padgett 
[1993] pp. 1259-1319).  
My aim with the project was not to make a comprehensive analysis but 
simply to give a structural presentation of a network of relations on the basis of 
the web pages of radical right-wing and extreme right-wing organizations 
selected for the purposes of the dissertation, as well as to disprove the 
hypothesis according to which contemporary Hungarian extreme right-wing 
subcultural organizations operate “alone”, isolated from radical (national) right-
wing political parties.2 
A basic assumption of the research is that the links on the examined 
web pages that point to other organizations also indicate existing relations 
between these similar organizations. When choosing the population (e.g. radical 
right-wing organizations) and the observational unit (e.g. the particular web 
pages) I opted for the web pages because I assumed that the pages of the 
examined organizations are accessible for an ever growing public; moreover, the 
web pages clearly show the existence of horizontal relations hypothesized in the 
theoretical part of the dissertation. 
                                                 
2 See: NBH Yearbooks 1999-2008. http://www.nbh.hu/bmenu7.htm. 
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For collecting data, I used snowball sampling, or respondent-driven 
sampling, which enabled me to “ask” each participant to “suggest” further 
available participants for the research. Thus, the most influential members of the 
extreme right-wing and radical (national) right-wing groups “made suggestions” 
for other web pages (which they considered as the most influential or powerful 
in their group) by creating a link to them on their own home page. As such, the 
data collection of the research was indeed progressing by snowball sampling. 
Besides, the “suggested” links were followed up on two separate tracks, and the 
results of the sampling were represented in a matrix. 
One of the most critical points of the analysis was related to sampling. 
Also, I had to deal with the methodological problem of how to delineate the 
population to be examined. I had to choose between the realistic and the 
nominalist approach, and I finally decided to go for the latter: I took as my 
starting point the organizations mentioned in the theoretical part of the 
dissertation (altogether 68 organizations), and started to follow up on their links 
in two “waves” or tracks with the help of snowball sampling. This way a 
network of relations of 120 organizations was mapped. A connection was 
considered “a relation” if a specific home page gave a working link to another 
page, or if the home page obviously presented another organization in a 
supportive way. This unsophisticated approach enabled me only to record the 
direction of relations (that is, I could only check whether two organizations 
mutually mentioned each other on their web pages, or whether the relation was 
only unidirectional). This did not provide me with any information on the 
strength and particular content of the connection. I simply assumed that the 
linking entailed some kind of ideological affiliation or spiritual community. For 
the purposes of this dissertation, I entered only those links in my database that 
pointed to organizations, and excluded those that connected to news portals or 
personal pages (they will be the subject of a future research project). The reason 
for this was that I primarily aimed to present an organizational network of 
relations that – developed into a strategic community – could contribute to the 
strengthening of JMMP into a really “new power” at the time of the 2009 EU 
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elections and delegate three representatives to the European Parliament, and 
later 47 representatives to the Hungarian Parliament at the time of the 2010 
national elections.  
 I used the following codes in the building of my database: 1. whether 
or not the web page was official; 2. in which wave of sampling the organization 
found its way into the database; 3. degree of legality and type of organizational 
form; 4. degree of radicalism; 5 nationality and place of foundation; 6. level of 
organization; 7. paramilitary or civil organization; 8. information on the use of 
arms/weapons; 9. proof of watching and guarding, and safekeeping activities at 
events; 10. evidence for activities related to guarding traditions and cultural 
legacies; and 11. proof of activities related to crisis management, maintenance 
of tombs, and environmental protection. 
The charts of the analysis were created in the sociological-statistical 
computer programs Ucinet 6. and SPSS 17.0. 
 
2.6. Time limits of the research 
 
I started my Internet research in December 2007, a few months after the 
formation of the first guards. When in 2008 I compared the web pages with my 
database, I was surprised to see that several of these pages were terminated or 
suspended. Thus, I decided to attempt to prove the uninterruptedness or 
continuous existence of the network of relations between the radicals and the 
extreme right-wingers on the basis of the sample I checked again in the period 
starting right after the legal attempt to dissolve the Hungarian Guard 
Association, that is, between December 2008 and the end of August 2009. This 
network of existence was continuously traceable in this period, despite the legal 
reprisals and certain conspirative factors (for example, the web page of HVIM 
does not have any links; however, it may still provide interesting data for the 
members of the movement and those competent in reading the movement 
online). I also updated my database by adding the organizations founded since 
the time I started my research. 
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I had to prove the existence of those relations that I suspected were 
there because they had not been researched in most of the studies, even though 
they could give an answer to the question whether the members of former 
extreme groups had an effective role in the formation of the various guards that 
provided a legal context for organization, and in the strengthening of right-wing 
(national) radicalism in Hungary. In the course of my web page analysis, I found 
a lot of evidence to qualify these hypotheses. 
In the case of the Independent Hungarian Guard (Protective Wing), an 
example to prove the existence of these relations was when the organization 
participated in a demonstration together with the former leader of the Blood and 
Honour Cultural Association (VBKE).  
 
3. Results and new research findings 
3.1. The most significant results of the research 
 
An important result of my research is that I give a comprehensive overview of 
the various “guards” and irregular paramilitary forces in Europe and Hungary. 
Although similar units appeared during the feudal period, the reasons for the 
emergence of contemporary guards are rooted in modern phenomena. In the 
postcommunist countries as well, it is the peculiarities of democratic transitions, 
rather than the historical past, that led to the formation of guards. 
This was partly preceded, and partly paralleled by, a process in which 
radical (national) right-wing groups gained power. Many of these groups in the 
“east” initiated the formation of armed forces. Lately, several radical right-wing 
parties and movements have achieved great success at the polls and gained seats 
in the European and national Parliaments. However, despite their loud success – 
or maybe exactly because of that –, European societies generally feel the need to 
curtail the operation of such organizations and gatherings.3  
                                                 
3 A Hungarian proof of this trend may come from he results of a survey made by Median Public Opinion and Market 
Research Institute. See: Ki mint fél, úgy ítél - A radikális jobboldal megítélése. [Your Fears Make Your Judgements – 
Opinions about the Radical Right] (30 August 2007) http://www.median.hu/object.9eeed0a8-efc2-4286-81ea-
4fe22cc801af.ivy. 
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Another result of my research is to point out that the radical economic 
transformation that came with the democratic transition in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the blow to social and job security that characterized Western European 
welfare states, and the rise of radical right-wing parties uncannily resemble the 
processes of the interwar period, when, as a result of the profound social, 
political and welfare shock caused by World War I and the Great Depression, 
Italian fascism and German national socialism came to power. But this analogy 
is misleading, since the historical situation is wholly different today. 
Contemporary “revolutionary” tendencies emerge within a different historical 
context, and extremist movements lack the support of the economic elite and the 
major strata of the bourgeoisie, without which no party can gain exclusive 
political power. Moreover, as the past couple of years show, the international 
situation does not encourage the strengthening of these tendencies either. Right-
wing radicalism is not a good option for the moderate parties to form a coalition 
with, and such attempts may also easily elicit sanctions from the European 
Union, as a result of which these governments might become isolated within the 
community of democratic states. 
Current changes in the labour market are also different from the 
situation the cataclysmic depression caused during the interwar period. The 
social and political climate has also changed, and as a result, today’s 
“charismatic leaders” can unite extreme parties and movements only for a short 
while. In their political rhetoric, they like to stress their wish to build direct 
democracy, a peculiar term to actually denote anti-democratism, and they talk 
about xenophobia and ethnocentrism-ethnopluralism instead of antisemitism. 
It is especially changes in the world of labour and economic-social 
crises that create a “market” for radical right and extreme right-wing ideologies. 
This also explains the large-scale migration of votes to radicals, as can be seen, 
for example, in France, Austria and Hungary. Parallel with the 
acknowledgement of these changes, charismatic political leaders, who mobilize 
people with extremist slogans, gain power in the middle of rising social anomie. 
Faith in democracy in general, and trust in politics and representative 
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democracy are shaken, which leads to the strenghtening of scapegoating and of 
the fear of difference, immigrants and migrant workers. Relative 
impoverishment also motivates the spreading of these attitudes, further ruining 
social solidarity and pointing to the lack of social cohesion and positive 
identification. The “double standard of meritocracy” that radicals use to 
question the fairness of social hierarchies leads to a renewed impetus to racism 
(see: Grajczjár [2007]). Therefore, economic changes, and individual ways of 
experiencing and responding to these changes have contributed to the general 
strengthening of these attitudes, regardless of party preferences. Many people 
have become responsive to extremist, radical and populist slogans, which has 
increased sympathy for right-wing political endeavours.  
Although some of the negative motifs of contemporary radical 
phenoma already emerged during the 19th century, today’s extremists like to 
refer to their positive predecessors. Such a positive predecessor in Hungary is 
the National Guard (Army National Guard) of 1948. However, the activists of 
JMMP, clad in their guardian and traditional horse herder uniforms, bring to life 
only part of the Kuruc and outlaw bravado that can be linked to the traditions of 
independence fights. They, however, also recall the antisocial and anti-property 
attitude that was characteristic of those outlaws pardoned by Franz Joseph I 
whose “ideology” was manifested in their gangs’ looting and robbing the 
population. In the case of present-day guards, this “outlaw avenger attitude” 
offers a whole range of interpretations. Their anti-elitism, therefore, also entails 
the questioning of the protection and safety of private property.   
There are a number of reasons why guards and such paramilitary 
groups were founded in Central and Eastern Europe, which may even vary 
country by country. As far as the guard movement is concerned, in Hungary it 
was István Simicskó (KDNP), MP for Fidesz-MPSZ, former state secretary for 
secret services, who first proposed in 2001 the formation of a voluntary National 
Guard, modelled on the Army National Guard of 1848, whose members would 
be trained to become reserve national guards. He first suggested the name of 
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Auxiliary Guard Force, then National Guard.4 His proposal was also connected 
to the upcoming termination of compulsory recruitment in the Hungarian Army. 
Simicskó’s idea, which was then a reaction to real challenges, was later 
“usurped” by Gábor Vona and JMMP in the name of national radicalism, and 
within a couple of months they founded several paramilitary groups that took 
organizational forms. 
The formation of illegal paramilitary organizations, which operate 
outside the state monopoly of violence, had not been an unknown phenomenon 
in Hungary. After the democratic transition, similar “private armies” already 
came to operation, such as the Hungarian National Front Line (MNA), led by 
István Györkös, which was one of the “pillars” of the Hungarian Wing of the 
Hungarist Movement (HMMSZ). MNA was known to put a great emphasis on 
discipline and military training.5 The “soldiers” of the organization fought in the 
Yugoslav civil war at Vukovar and Osijek (Eszék) on the Croatian side; and 
their commemorations of the siege of Budapest in the Buda Castle can be 
regarded as military demonstrations of power. Gábor Vona and JMMP partly 
legalized these units by providing a legal framework of operation with their 
recruitment to the units. This endeavour coincided with the April 2007 plan of 
László Toroczkai and György Budaházy to organize a “parallel Hungary”. 
What was new was simply the wish to create a dynamically developing and 
legal organizational framework for them, different from that of the illegally 
operating “guerilla troops”. For the European and national parliamentary 
elections, JMMP neglected (“betrayed”) the guardians. The organization found 
itself turning more and more into a political advertisement. With its foundation, 
JMMP took the opportunity to attract the radical members of moderate right-
wing parties, the sympathizers of former radical (national) right-wing parties, 
and the membership of far-right organizations that had earlier been dissolved.  
                                                 
4 Simicskó István disassociated himself with the Hungarian Guard right after its foundation. In fact, he warned everyone 
against organizing an “armed banderium”. According to the chair of the National Security Committee, it would be 
unfortunate if political forces recruited guards, and if the members of extreme right-wing movements or a “new workers’ 
militia” wanted to guard the nation according to their own standards. 
5 This illegal organization was formerly known as the Hungarian National Socialist Task Force. Its centre is still in Bőny, 
and as MNA is an illegal movement, the number of its members is hard to estimate. Györkös’s son, Kolos Györkös also 
succeeded in getting a seat in the local government of the village. 
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The traditional neonazi extreme right and its paramilitary units had 
been marginalized since the turn of the millenium. Their supporters were trying 
to find new organizational frameworks, “swinging” between extreme ideologies 
and right-wing radicalism. For them, the foundation of the Hungarian Guard 
was thus a way out of the dead-end street of the far-right subculture. 
Therefore, the foundation of the guards was a warning sign exactly 
because it provided a legal framework of operation for elements that had been 
heavily rejected before. As such, this process started to pose a general threat to 
democracy. My research has also shown that the home page of the Hungarian 
Guard is among the most popular links of extreme right web pages. 
Besides the Guard, other paramilitary organizations were also formed, 
such as the Nyíregyháza-based Army National Guard, and the MOVE, which 
soon split, and its more militant division founded the National Liberation Front 
of Hungarian Defenders. Among these organizations were the National Guard, 
and later the Carpathian Home Militia, and several other formations or so-called 
“traditional societies”. One of the most well-known, and maybe also the most 
“belligerent”, of these organizations is the Hungarian Guard. 
Obviously, it is not a feeling of nostalgia for the past that primarily 
motivates the formation of these guards, but the problems of the present day. 
The predecessors of these guards were all formed as a kind of reaction to 
Hungary’s loss of World War I and the ensuing national catastrophe. The guards 
founded after the democratic transition in the countries of the region are the 
results of the social and existential shock that derived from the transition (and 
only in some exceptional cases were they the products of a new period of civil 
warfare, in territories lying south of Hungary). 
The mobilization of right-wing (national) radicals is present in all of 
Central and Eastern Europe. This process includes the formation of guard-type 
units in many countries. In the whole of our region, there are five basic reasons 
for the organization of guards: 1. the failure of paternalist or welfare regimes; 2. 
corruption in privatization and state affairs; 3. accession to the European Union 
(which many think has disproved all high hopes); 4. the unsolved problem of 
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ethnic minorities’ “integration into the nation”; and 5. the negative 
consequences of globalization. 
In Europe, since the end of World War II, the legal monopoly of 
violence includes only the army and police force of the state, so any attempt at 
taking over this monopoly is prohibited by law. Thus, the European public is 
concerned about the reorganization of guards in our region. Their appearance 
recalls the nightmare of Weimarization, coups d’état and attempts at subverting 
state power, and the fear that the strengthening of political populism – the effect 
of which can be registered in Central and Eastern Europe – may put an end to 
democratic consolidation. 
Before 2004 and the EU-accession, just like before Hungary’s NATO-
accession, the spreading of populist and radical ideologies was hindered, as the 
majority of Hungary’s population did not want to be rid of the alternatives 
offered either by NATO or by the EU-integration. However, after 2004, this 
“hindrance” could not moderate public opinion any more. Shortly after the 
accession (in Hungary in the fall of 2006), radical sentiments started to become 
stronger. The relations between moderate political parties gradually worsened as 
well. Both the governmental and the economic crisis motivated the expansion of 
radicalism. 
In my dissertation I attempted to give an analysis of the network of 
relations between the moderate right, radical right-wing and extreme right-wing 
organizations, and thereby show the connection between the radicals and the 
extremists, which remained intact despite the dissolution of the Hungarian 
Guard Movement. The official home page of the Hungarian Guard was proved 
to be a strong node of the network, followed by the home page of JMMP and 
HVIM, and even the mere examination of similarities in their relations points to 
a homogenous group of these organizations. Therefore, every structural aspect – 
in accordance with what I postulate in the theoretical part of the dissertation – 
constructs these organizations as central, thus having an extended network of 
relations, from the point of view of radical (national) right-wing and extreme 
right-wing web pages in my sample. Besides, as the results of my research 
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show, although most of the extreme right-wing organizations opearate illegally, 
they still have contact with legal radical (national) right-wing organizations, 
since the extremists like to refer to them in their weblinks. 
In light of the results, the research can be extended, first, to several 
European countries, and second, with content analysis, and data from interviews 
and questionnaires. These, however, must be the subject and task of another 
research project.  
 
3.2. The most important new findings of the dissertation 
 
The new aspect of the dissertation is the analysis of the social and political 
background and the world of relations that contextualize the foundation of 
guards. It shows the network of relations between right-wing (national) radicals 
and the extreme right, which is based on the “prestige principle”. An important 
new feature of the work is to emphasize the significant historical antecedents of 
militia-type or guard-type organizations working within or outside the state 
monopoly of violence, both in Europe and in Hungary. Therefore, they provide 
either legally or illegally coded historical messages that are still useful from the 
point of view of initiating the organization of national defence and auxiliary 
forces. This also holds true for both the historically acceptable and unacceptable 
organizations. In the past centuries, need, despair, fear and direct threat have 
often motivated people to form alliances to protect their smaller or greater 
communities. This was the case with the National Guard of 1848 and 1956, 
when there was need to keep internal order, protect the achievements of the 
revolution, and fight back foreign intervention with a militia-based, extended 
“guard”. And there was also need for the sudden transformation of these law 
enforcement units into armed forces in the protection of the country, which 
formed the basis for, or the auxiliary to, the independent national army as well 
as the defence of Hungary.  
In both historical situations it was vital that the National Guard was 
organized by the legitimate, new political elite. They were built on civil 
courage; however, the units were not formed separately or as guerilla troops, but 
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were legalized by becoming directly subordinated to the leaders of the 
respective revolutions. It is necessary to note this, since today certain social 
groups make initiatives that are important from some point of view (e.g. 
territorial defence, crisis management, etc.), but often the way these are realized 
does not conform either to the expectations of the majority of the population, or 
to legal regulations or parliamentary decisions. Moreover, the unofficially 
organized guards are dedicated in terms of party politics and movement 
ideologies, so, exactly because of their exclusionary ideas, they do not enjoy the 
unanimous support of the society, as they are formed illegally and not for the 
protection of all the people of the nation. 
Another new aspect of the work is to point out that in the case of 
militia-type organizations which traditionally work according to the “civil-
soldier” principle, the use of the name “National Guard” – the history of which 
may even be traced throughout several centuries – indicates a tradition of social 
self-organization. It shows the historical roots, embededness and continuity of 
the particular organization, and strengthens the dedication of its members to the 
cause of defending the nation. In the case of today’s guards operating illegally, 
however, it is obvious that they do not primarily stand for such a historical 
legacy, but rather, the outlaw nature, the (right-wing) “revolutionary traditions” 
– and, variably, even the “counter-revolutionary”, usurper and racist 
characteristics – of post-World War I troops, guards and commandos. A 
significant difference between the progressive traditions of the 19th and 20th 
centuries and the latter organizations is that the historical national guards 
mentioned above were organized to ward off imminent threat to the nation, and 
retaliation or the desire to terrorize were not among the reasons for their 
mobilization. 
I want to make it clear that in our region the historical situation has 
considerably changed in comparison with the historical context of 1848 and 
1956 described above. After our accession to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization and the European Union, there is no imminent military threat, nor 
is there a revolutionary situation, although the chance for neither of these can be 
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totally dismissed in the long run. Nevertheless, there is surely a need for 
volunteer militias that are subordinated to the national army, since the regular 
army alone would not be able to defend the country, or only at a great cost. 
Since national defence is a public concern, in which the whole population has to 
take part (and probably many will be willing to actually take part in it), the 
foundation of a national guard is always a current issue, and as a rational 
necessity, it calls for and deserves attention. Even more so since the 
organization of unofficial guards also indicates there is a social need for such 
troops; it is another problem that this need is used by ideologically dedicated 
organizations for their own political purposes.  
 I also wish to stress that militias and guards also exist in the USA, 
Great Britain, and the moderate countries of Western Europe, where democracy 
has its historical traditions, just like in most of the neighbouring Central and 
Eastern European countries. Still, the foundation of yet another new 
paramilitary organization – especially in Central and Eastern Europe – keeps 
causing a stir in public opinion, especially in the neighbouring countries, some 
of which still consider Hungary as a risk factor. As many of the countries in the 
region have their own official “new armed forces”, the major tasks of which 
may be related to territorial defence, in countries where there are no units 
similar to the Hungarian guards, or where their operation has already been 
suspended by force of law, illegally organized, racist, chauvinist, and militant 
units obviously breed distrust. 
In the military practice of Hungary’s neighbouring countries, there are 
official guards and militias which are rightfully dedicated to the cause of 
territorial self-defence. These troops, however, came to life as alternatives to 
regular armies and militia-based territorial defence. Thus, there is a necessary 
need in Hungary, too, to organize a new, militia-type armed unit for the support 
of the Hungarian Defence Forces, which, as opposed to the guards organized by 
right-wing (national) radicals, is firmly embedded in the society, enjoys wide 
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social support, and causes no diplomatic friction with the neighbouring 
countries.6  
This practice has long been in place in non-neighbouring countries. 
The most well-known example is the US National Guard, which differs from 
European and similarly structured armed forces in many historical and practical 
respects, but a firm basis for its social support, besides patriotism, is the 
multilevel support system that American guards enjoy today. Further interesting 
examples include the Scandinavian (Swedish) model, and the militias in the 
Baltic states, which were also organized on the basis of the Swedish model. Of 
course, these national guards were formed for concrete situations and perception 
of threat, and involve a large part of the population even today. Their basic 
principle is the concept of total defence, which they are meant to provide as 
auxiliary forces to the regular army. 
European national guards are usually subordinated to the Ministry of 
Defence, but in many countries they work under the supervision of a separate 
headquarters in times of peace. They generally show historical rootedness and 
continuity, in most of the cases from the time of their foundation. Territorial 
defence is normally their top priority task. The training of such forces is thus 
more complicated than that of regular armies, partly because their basic 
characteristics are voluntary service, patriotic conditioning, and large-scale 
social support, since they serve a common cause. Therefore, national guards and 
similar organizations tend to have the support of the whole society, either in 
crisis management tasks or defence operations, as shown, for example, in 
Sweden, where the guard is supported by clubs and other kinds of social activist 
groups. 
In my dissertation I also emphasize that, as a result of a switch to 
professional and volunteer armies, a section of the society which is ready to get 
armed is no longer convinced about the army’s ability to protect the country. 
                                                 
6 After the submission of my dissertation, it was announced that the first reserve volunteers, who would serve as 
defenders and safeguards nationwide, were to enter service on 1 January 2011. These units would defend 57 military 
bases and other territories in place of civil defenders and guards. About 2000 reserve volunteers were to enter service at 
the beginning of 2011. See: “Szolgálatba léptek az önkéntes katonák” [“Volunteers Enter Service”], MTI, 2 January 2011, 
Sunday, HírExtra. http://www.hirextra.hu/2011/01/02/szolgalatba-leptek-az-onkentes-katonak./ 
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(The professional army, even taken together with its reserve forces, makes up 
just a fraction of the country’s adult population that can be armed in time of 
war.) In some social groups, however, interest in weaponry and the handling of 
weapons is still prevailing. (This, of course, is but one of the reasons for the 
foundation of illegal guards.) Thus, many are right to think that people’s 
motivation to protect the country should not be wasted, it must be maintained, 
and this maintenance is better to be done within an official framework, rather 
than outside the state monopoly of violence, in the form of paramilitary, 
irregular troops, or under the influence of radical ideologies. No doubt some of 
the population still thinks it is necessary to receive a minimum amount of 
military training, which is vital in extreme situations where military skills are 
needed for national defence. However, these attitudes are also easy to use and 
abuse for political purposes.  
With official support and regional cooperation, these endeavours may 
lead to the commencement of a peace process among Central and Eastern 
European societies, and could marginalize the dissident ambitions of Central 
and Eastern European political extremists. The cause of national defence would 
also be served much better by the formation of an unpolitical or “supra-
political” organization than by a biased, politically dedicated, radical and 
internationally discarded guard. 
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